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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk
aversion in the expected utility model. I derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion
(g) in terms of (1) the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to the wage elasticity and (2) the
degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. I bound the degree of complementarity
using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies randomly across states. Using labor
supply elasticity estimates from thirty-three studies, I find a mean estimate of g = 1. I then show that
generating g > 2 would require that wage increases cause sharper reductions in labor supply than
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chetty@econ.berkeley.eduExpected utility is the canonical theory of choice under uncertainty in economics. In the
expected utility model, risk aversion arises solely from the curvature of the utility function,
typically measured by the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ). This paper shows that
evidence on the eﬀects of wage changes on labor supply imposes a tight upper bound on
the curvature of utility over wealth (γ < 2). Hence, the standard expected utility model
cannot generate high levels of risk aversion without contradicting established facts about
labor supply.
Labor supply behavior and risk aversion are tightly linked in the expected utility model
because both are determined by the curvature of utility over consumption. To see the
connection, consider the eﬀect of a wage increase on labor supply in a static model where an
agent maximizes utility over consumption and leisure. If the marginal utility of consumption
diminishes quickly, the individual becomes sated with goods as wages rise. A highly risk
averse individual will therefore choose to consume more leisure (by reducing labor supply)
as wages rise. More generally, a higher curvature of utility over consumption implies a lower
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply.
The bound on risk aversion is obtained by combining this logic with empirical evidence
on the wage elasticity. A well established ﬁnding of the labor supply literature is that wage
increases do not cause sharp reductions in labor supply. This lower bound on the wage
elasticity of labor supply places an upper bound on the curvature of utility over consumption
and hence on risk aversion. The fact that individuals do not choose to reduce labor supply
sharply when wages rise implies that their marginal utility of consumption does not diminish
quickly, unless consumption and labor are very complementary.
If complementarity between consumption and labor is suﬃciently strong, even highly
risk averse individuals may choose not to reduce labor supply when wages rise because
increased consumption makes work less painful. Therefore, bounding γ using labor supply
elasticities requires that we ﬁrst bound the degree of complementarity between consumption
and labor. Such a bound can be obtained from evidence on consumption choices when agents
1face uncertainty about labor supply. Intuitively, the extent to which an agent chooses to
correlate consumption with labor across states where labor supply varies exogenously (e.g.,
because of job loss or disability) reveals the degree of complementarity. Combining the
bound on complementarity with estimates of labor supply elasticities yields a bound on γ
that does not rely on any assumptions beyond those inherent in expected utility theory.
I formalize the preceding logic in a dynamic lifecycle model with arbitrary non-separable
utility over consumption and leisure. I derive a formula for γ in terms of the ratio of the
income elasticity of labor supply to the substitution elasticity of labor supply along with the
cardinal complementarity parameter. I bound the complementarity parameter using a set
of estimates of the consumption drop associated with job loss and other exogenous shocks to
labor supply. I then estimate γ using labor supply elasticity estimates from various types of
microeconomic studies — e.g., structural lifecycle methods, natural experiments, and earned
income responses — as well as macroeconomic observations such as the downward trend in
labor supply over the past century. Using thirty-three sets of estimates of wage and income
elasticities, the mean implied value of γ is 0.71,w i t har a n g eo f0.15 to 1.78 in the additive
utility case. At the upper bound for complementarity, the mean value of γ rises modestly,
to 0.97.
I clarify why all the labor supply studies imply a low level of γ despite disagreement about
the magnitudes of the elasticities using a calibration argument. I show that generating γ > 2
with a plausible level of complementarity requires an uncompensated wage elasticity of labor
supply more negative than that estimated in any of the thirty-three studies.
The bound on risk aversion derived here contrasts with the much higher estimates of risk
aversion obtained in studies of asset and insurance markets (e.g., Rajnish Mehra and Edward
Prescott 1985, Narayana Kocherlakota 1996, Robert Barsky et. al. 1997, Alma Cohen and
Liran Einav 2005, Justin Sydnor 2005). This paper therefore provides new evidence that
the conventional expected utility model falls short of explaining choices under uncertainty
in many domains. Importantly, the calibration argument here restricts risk preferences over
2all risks, and not just the small gambles or low probability events that are the basis of many
existing critiques (Chris Starmer 2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I gives graphical intuition for the bounding
argument, and derives a formula for risk aversion in terms of labor supply elasticities and
complementarity between consumption and labor. Section II implements the formula using
existing estimates of these parameters. Section III discusses how this paper is related to
other recent calibration arguments for risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Section
IV concludes.
IT h e o r y
Basic Setup. Consider a T period life-cycle model. Denote consumption in each period
by ct and labor supply by lt.L e t U(c1,...,c T,l 1,...,lT) denote utility over the consumption
and labor streams. Let pt denote the price of consumption in period t. Assume that U is
smooth and that Uct > 0,U lt < 0,u ctct < 0,u ltlt < 0.L e t wθt denote the wage in period t
and y unearned income (wealth) at time 0. In Thomas MaCurdy’s (1981) terminology, a
change in θt is a transitory wage change, while changes in w are permanent wage changes,
i.e. shifts in the entire proﬁle of wages over a lifetime.




s.t. p1c1 + ... + pTcT = y + w(θ1l1 + ... + θTlT)
It is convenient to rewrite this problem as a two-stage maximization:
max
c,l u(c,l) s.t. c = y + wl (1)
where u(c,l)=m a x
ct,lt
U(c1,...,c T,l 1,...,lT)
3s.t. p1c1 + ... + pTcT = c
θ1l1 + ... + θTlT = l
In (1), c and l represent aggregates that capture total consumption and labor supply over
the lifecycle. The function u(c,l) is indirect utility over these two composite commodities.
O u rg o a li st od e r i v eab o u n df o rt h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion of the indirect utility
function u(c,l),d e ﬁned as follows:









Note that γ is the curvature of utility over wealth — the parameter that determines risk
preferences over immediately-resolved wealth gambles in an expected utility model — when
total labor supply l is ﬁxed. When l is variable, the curvature of utility over wealth is
strictly lower than γ (see appendix A for a proof). Intuitively, if the agent can adjust labor
supply, he has more ﬂexibility to adjust to wealth shocks, and is less risk averse (Zvi Bodie
et. al. 1992). A bound on γ therefore bounds risk aversion when l is endogenous as well.
Bounding Risk Aversion: Graphical Example. The main result follows from the compar-
ative statics implied by the agent’s ﬁrst order condition for l. At an interior optimum, the
marginal beneﬁt of working an extra hour equals the marginal cost:
wuc(y + wl,l)=−ul(y + wl,l) (3)
Figure 1 illustrates the calibration argument using this ﬁrst order condition. It plots
the marginal consumption utility of working an extra hour, wuc(y +wl,l) and the marginal
disutility of working that hour, −ul(y + wl,l). The initial level of labor supply, l0,i s
determined by the intersection of these two curves at the initial wage w0. For simplicity,
the ﬁgure is drawn for a case where the agent has no unearned income (y =0 ).
Suppose ﬁrst that the agent has additive utility over c and l (ucl =0 ). Consider the
4eﬀect of raising w by 1 percent on l. This change has two eﬀects on the wuc curve, which
correspond to a substitution and income eﬀect on labor supply. The substitution eﬀect
is that the number multiplying uc rises by 1 percent, shifting the wuc curve upward by 1
percent. The 1 percent increase in w also increases consumption (wl)a ta n yg i v e nl e v e lo f
l by 1 percent. A 1 percent increase in consumption lowers uc by εuc,c = γ,s ot h e1 percent
wage increase shifts the wuc curve downward by γ p e r c e n tv i at h ei n c o m ee ﬀect. The total
shift in the wuc c u r v ei st h u s(1−γ) percent. This expression shows that higher γ makes the
wage elasticity of labor supply more negative by magnifying the income eﬀect. Intuitively,
when γ is high, the marginal beneﬁt of consumption falls quickly as the wage rises. This
strengthens the incentive to consume more leisure (by reducing l)w h e nw rises.
Since changes in w do not aﬀect the −ul curve when ucl =0 , it follows that
∂l/∂w>0 ⇔ γ < 1
when y =0 . This result is the simplest version of the bound on risk aversion imposed
by labor supply behavior. The remainder of the paper generalizes this bound to allow for
positive unearned income (y>0), a potentially negative wage elasticity of labor supply, and
complementarity between c and l. These factors loosen the bound on γ slightly (to γ < 2),
but the basic logic of the calibration argument is the same: If upward shifts in the wage
proﬁle do not cause sharp reductions in lifetime labor supply, γ must be small.
Complementarity between c and l causes shifts in the −ul c u r v ei nF i g u r e1a sw rises. If
ucl > 0,t h e−ul curve shifts outward when w rises and l rises more than it would if ucl =0 .
Consequently, the value of γ estimated from labor supply elasticities under the assumption
that ucl =0understates the true γ if ucl > 0. This issue is addressed below using empirical
evidence from studies of consumption smoothing to place bounds on the magnitude of ucl.
Given these bounds, the range of possible shifts in the −ul curve is narrow, as illustrated by
the shaded region in Figure 1. The bound on γ is thus loosened modestly when plausible
5levels of complementarity are permitted.
An Estimator for γ. To generalize the example in Figure 1, I derive a formula for γ in
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This equation shows that γ is determined by the ratio of the income elasticity of labor
supply to the substitution elasticity of labor supply, with an adjustment for complementarity
between c and l.1 This is because the income eﬀect is proportional to ucc (how much the
marginal consumption utility from working falls when y is raised) while the substitution
1Note that (7) remains well deﬁned when y =0 .I n t h a t c a s e , t h e ﬁrst term in (7) equals −∂lw
∂y /εlc,w.
The ∂lw
∂y term is the propensity to earn out of unearned income (in dollars rather than a percentage, which
would be undeﬁned).
6eﬀect is proportional to uc (how much the marginal consumption utility from working rises
when w is raised). For example, when utility is linear in c,t h e r ea r en oi n c o m ee ﬀects
in labor supply, and γ =0 . N o t et h a tt h ef o r m u l ai nf o rγ in (7) does not rely on any
functional form assumptions; hence, the bounds derived below apply to any utility function.
Cardinality and Complementarity. It may be surprising that a unique value for γ can be
identiﬁed from labor-leisure choices. Since non-linear monotonic transformations of u(c,l)
do not aﬀect the choice of l,a r et h e r en o ti n ﬁnitely many values of γ that could be associated
with a given set of labor supply data? The reason that γ is identiﬁed in (7) is that any
non-linear transformation of u would change the value of εuc,l. For example, non-linear
transformations of an additive u (with ucl =0 ) destroy additivity. Labor supply data are
thus suﬃcient to identify γ conditional on the value εuc,l, which pins down the cardinal
normalization of u.
Since the cardinal complementarity parameter εuc,l is unknown, it must be estimated
from choices under uncertainty. A natural method of estimating εuc,l is to examine the
consumption choices of individuals who face exogenous variation in labor supply across states,
e.g. due to a shock such as job displacement. Intuitively, if agents choose to consume a
lot more in states where labor supply is high, c and l must be highly complementary; if in
contrast labor supply ﬂuctuations are not correlated with consumption changes, c and l must
not be very complementary.
To obtain an estimate of εuc,l based on this logic, consider a setting with two states where
agents work for l1 hours in state 1 (which occurs with probability p)a n dl2 hours in state 2
(probability 1−p). Assume that preferences are state-independent, i.e. the utility function
in the two states is the same. Let ws denote the wage in state s. Suppose the agent
can trade consumption at an actuarially fair rate between the two states using an insurance
policy. We will see below that if perfect insurance of this form is unavailable, the exercise
below provides an upper bound for εuc,l and thereby an upper bound for γ.
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The remainder of this section exploits this condition to link the εuc,l parameter of interest to
a magnitude that can be empirically estimated. Let ∆c = c2 − c1 and ∆l = l2 − l1 denote
the change in consumption and labor across the two states. A ﬁr s t - o r d e rT a y l o re x p a n s i o n










where R, the remainder, must satisfy lim∆l→0 R =0 . Therefore, in the optimal allocation,














Equation (8) shows that εuc,l is proportional to ∆c
c /∆l
l , the percentage drop in consumption
associated with a 1 percent diﬀerence in labor supply across states. This expression reﬂects
the intuition described above: If the consumption change across states where labor supply
diﬀe r si ss m a l l ,εuc,l must be small. The curvature of utility (γ) is also relevant because it
determines the cost of consumption ﬂuctuations in the expected utility model. The limit
∆l → 0 is necessary because εuc,l can be identiﬁed at a given point (c1,l 1) without functional
8form assumptions only by observing the eﬀect of small variations in l on c.
Importantly, in the more realistic case where insurance markets are incomplete, con-
sumption will fall beyond the optimal amount when labor supply is low. Hence, imper-
fections in insurance markets will make the observed consumption drop overstate the true
complementarity-related consumption drop and consequently overstate the true values of
εuc,l and γ.
Using (8) and (7), we can solve for γ to obtain an estimator for risk aversion in terms of


















Extensive Margin. The best established eﬀects of wage changes are on the participation
margin, perhaps because ﬁxed costs of participation and institutional restrictions limit hours
choices (see e.g. Joseph Altonji and Christina Paxson 1991). Estimates of participation
elasticities can also be used to infer γ.L e t θ denote the fraction of agents who work, εθ,y
the income elasticity of participation, and εθ,w the wage elasticity of participation. Let ∆c
c
denote the diﬀerence in consumption when working and not working chosen by the agent in
an experiment involving uncertain labor supply analogous to the complementarity exercise













2Details are given in Appendix C.
9II Empirical Implementation
II.A Estimates of Complementarity
Equation (9) shows that an upper bound on ∆c
c /∆l
l is required to obtain an upper bound on γ.
A bound on complementarity would ideally be derived from the consumption choices of agents
who face small, permanent exogenous shocks to labor supply.3 The most obvious empirical
analogs to this experiment are estimates of the consumption change associated with shocks
such as job loss or disability. John Cochrane (1991) and Jonathan Gruber (1997, 1998)
ﬁnd that job loss causes a consumption drop of less than 10 percent. In subsequent work,
Martin Browning and Thomas Crossley (2001) and Hans Bloemen and Elena Stancanelli
(2005) show that consumption does not fall at all for individuals with positive liquid wealth
prior to job loss. In addition, these studies ﬁnd that higher unemployment beneﬁts are
associated with smaller consumption drops, and that with full insurance, there would be no
drop at all. These results imply that most of the observed 10 percent consumption drop is
due to imperfect insurance markets rather than complementarity between consumption and
labor.
There are two concerns in connecting the 10 percent bound to the actual ∆c
c /∆l
l parameter
of interest. First, the studies of job loss examine large ﬂuctuations in l and therefore may
not provide a good estimate of lim∆l→0
∆c
c /∆l
l if complementarity is much greater for small
ﬂuctuations in l than large ones. This concern is unlikely to be a serious problem in practice.
Studies that examine smaller ﬂuctuations in hours than full unemployment (e.g., Browning
et. al. 1985) ﬁnd estimates of ∆c
c /∆l
l that are of the same magnitude as those reported by
studies of larger ﬂuctuations in l. Moreover, most of the changes in labor supply resulting
from changes in wages and unearned income tend to be large and discrete as well (e.g., from
20 to 40 hours). The range of ∆l over which complementarity is estimated is therefore
3The shocks must be “exogenous” in the sense that they are involuntary changes in labor supply, as
opposed to preference shocks that endogenously induce labor supply changes.
10similar to the range over which the labor supply elasticities themselves are estimated. As
equation (10) for the extensive margin case shows, if only discrete changes in labor supply
are feasible, it is preferable to have estimates of the consumption drop when l ﬂuctuates over
a similar set of discrete values.4
The second concern, which is deeper, is that studies of job loss examine temporary
ﬂuctuations in labor (variation in lt for a given period t) and not permanent ﬂuctuations
(variation in l). In the notation of the model, these studies estimate ∆ct
ct /∆lt
lt for a single
period t rather than the desired value ∆c
c /∆l
l that reﬂects changes in lifetime aggregates.





lt is determined by the degree of cross-period complementarity in consumption.5
Intuitively, if consumption is complementary across periods (as in habit formation models),
agents will be more reluctant to cut consumption in response to transitory ﬂuctuations in
labor than permanent ones. Durability of consumption and adjustment costs could further
attenuate the short-run response.
To gauge the diﬀerence between short-run and long-run complementarity, I use evidence
on consumption responses to long-term labor supply changes induced by disability or retire-
ment. Cochrane (1991) ﬁnds that long-term disabilities cause a 11 percent drop in food
consumption in the year that the shock occurs. Melvin Stephens (2001) shows that in the
ﬁve years after disability occurs, consumption does not trend downward signiﬁcantly, and is
at most 10 percent lower than the pre-disability level. These results suggest that long-run
complementarity (∆c
c /∆l
l ) is not much greater than short-run (∆ct
ct /∆lt
lt ) complementarity. If
it were, there would be either a large immediate drop in consumption or a sharp downward
trend in consumption in the years after disability.
4Relatedly, the estimates of γ based on participation elasticities — which require estimates of ∆c
c from
ﬂuctuations in labor force participation — yield very similar estimates of γ (see Table 1). This suggests that
discreteness is unlikely to be an important source of bias here.
5See Appendix D for a formal derivation relating the two parameters. Karen Dynan (2001) ﬁnds no
complementarity in consumption across periods in microdata, but studies using macro data ﬁnd evidence of
habit.
11In related work, Paul Gertler and Gruber (2002) ﬁnd that long-term health shocks leading
to job loss are associated with less than a 20 percent reduction in non-health consumption
(which includes durables) in Indonesia. Gertler and Gruber test whether incomplete insur-
ance or complementarity between c and l is responsible for this drop in several ways. For
instance, they show that the consumption drop is small in families where the person expe-
riencing the shock is not the sole earner (because other household members help to smooth
consumption). They conclude from this and other evidence that the complementarity-related
portion of the 20 percent drop is close to zero.
One concern with the disability-based evidence is that the assumption of state-independent
preferences may not hold for health shocks.6 Studies of retirement provide additional evi-
dence on complementarity that helps mitigate such concerns. Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst
(2005) use detailed data on expenditures to show that expenditure drops at retirement by
less than 15 percent.7 Douglas Bernheim et. al. (2001) show that there is no downward
trend in expenditures in the years after retirement. These ﬁndings are also consistent with
the claim that ∆c
c /∆l
l is not much larger than ∆ct
ct /∆lt
lt .
In summary, evidence on the eﬀect of job loss on consumption implies ∆ct
ct /∆lt
lt < 0.1.
An examination of the diﬀerences between this estimate and the long-run complementarity
parameter of interest suggests a bound of ∆c
c /∆l
l < 0.15.
II.B Labor Supply Elasticities
This section describes a set of elasticity estimates from studies of labor supply and reports
the γ implied by each study. There is a controversial debate about which empirical methods
yield the most reliable estimates of labor supply elasticities. I show that irrespective of the
6For example, Cochrane (1991, p974) notes that “sick people might lose their appetites” and therefore
consume less. Insofar as health shocks reduce the taste for non-health consumption, the consumption drops
associated with disability overstate the true level of complementarity between c and l.
7In Aguiar and Hurst’s time input model, the bound derived in this paper is a bound on the curvature of
utility over expenditure, holding labor supply ﬁxed. This remains an upper bound on curvature of utility
over wealth, following the derivation in Appendix A.
12method used to estimate the elasticities, the implied value of γ is always low.
Labor supply studies can be broadly classiﬁed into four categories: (1) The “static”
approach estimates reduced-form labor supply responses to events such as tax changes, cross-
sectional diﬀerences, or lottery winnings. Richard Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) show that
these static estimates can be interpreted as labor supply responses to the permanent changes
in wages and unearned income of interest when an appropriate set of controls for age and
cohort are included. (2) The “life cycle” or “structural” literature, pioneered by MaCurdy
(1981), explicitly models dynamic labor supply and consumption choices and backs out
estimates of labor supply responses to permanent shifts in wage proﬁles and unearned income
from life cycle variation in wages in a panel dataset. These estimates correspond more
directly to the permanent wage-elasticities (e.g., εc
l,w)o fi n t e r e s t ,b u ti d e n t i ﬁcation of these
models is often diﬃc u l tbe c a u s eo ft h el a c ko fe x o g e n o u ss h i f t si nw a g ep r o ﬁles. Recent studies
that combine the beneﬁts of exogenous variation used in the static studies with the structural
lifecycle approach give perhaps the most credible microeconomic estimates of long-run wage
elasticities (Blundell et. al. 1998). (3) A more recent “earned income” literature, starting
with Martin Feldstein (1995, 1999), examines the eﬀect of tax reforms on total earned income
as a means of capturing other margins of labor supply beyond hours (e.g., eﬀort or job-related
training). Estimates from this literature can be used to estimate γ by replacing the elasticity
ratio
εl,y
εlc,w used in (7) with
εLI,y
εLIc,1−τ,w h e r eLI is labor income and 1−τ the net-of-tax rate. (4)
Finally, long-run macroeconomic trends and cross-country comparisons can be used to make
inferences about long-run labor supply elasticities, potentially overcoming the institutional
rigidities and some of the omitted variable biases that may aﬀect the microeconomic studies.8
Table 1 presents a set of income and substitution elasticities from studies using each of
these methods. The ﬁrst two sets of estimates (hours and participation elasticities) are from
studies that use the traditional static and lifecycle approaches. The third section shows es-
8The elasticities from the micro-level studies should yield consistent estimates of γ even if there are
frictions which prevent agents from reoptimizing fully in the short-run. These frictions presumably attenuate
both εl,y and εc
l,w, leaving the ratio of the two elasticities unaﬀected.
13timates from studies of earned income responses, and the fourth shows the macroeconomic
evidence. The macro estimates are constructed using a lower bound on the uncompensated
wage elasticity based on the secular downward trend in hours over the past century (doc-
umented e.g. by Casey Mulligan 2002) combined with estimates of substitution elasticities
from other studies (see Appendix B for details).
To obtain a broad sense of the values of γ consistent with labor supply evidence, the table
includes elasticity estimates for a wide range of groups, such as prime age males, married
women, retired individuals, and low income families. Estimates of γ are computed at the
mean values of y,w, and l in each study. Note that the mean values of
y
wl vary widely across
the studies. For example, married women’s unearned income equals at least their husband’s
income, which is generally larger than their own earned income.
Column (6) of Table 1 reports estimates of γ for the additive utility case. The overall
(unweighted) mean estimate of γ across the 33 sets of elasticity estimates is γ =0 .71.
Only 3 studies imply a value of γ above 1.25 when ucl =0 .9 The macroeconomic evidence
suggests slightly higher values of risk aversion than the microeconomic studies because the
downward trend in labor supply over time implies a signiﬁcantly larger income eﬀect than
substitution eﬀect. The estimates from Blundell et. al.’s (1998) study, which perhaps
addresses the central identiﬁcation concerns in estimating labor supply elasticities most
cleanly, yield γ =0 .93. Column (7) of Table 1 reports estimates of γ that account for
complementarity consistent with the bound of ∆c
c /∆l
l =0 .15. This adjustment increases the
average estimate of γ to 0.97.
9John Pencavel (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Gruber and Emmanuel Saez (2002) summarize
more than sixty other microeconomic studies that span various methodologies, nearly all of which imply
γ < 1.25 as well.
14II.C A Calibration Argument
The similarity of the estimates of γ across the labor supply studies despite their diﬀerences in
methodology, deﬁnitions of labor supply, and sample composition may be surprising. This
section provides a calibration argument that explains the consensus on γ. Intuitively, the
consensus emerges from the uniform ﬁnding that εl,w is not very negative, which implies that
the income elasticity cannot be large relative to the substitution elasticity. This places an
upper bound on γ because it depends on the ratio of these two elasticities.
To formalize this argument, consider ﬁrst the common benchmark of an upward-sloping
labor supply curve (Prescott (1986), Robert Hall and John Taylor (1991)).10 Using the
Slutsky equation and (9), it follows that
εl,w ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ < 1+
y
wl
with additive utility. In the aggregate,
y
wl equals the ratio of capital income to labor
income, which is 1
2 in the U.S. Hence, with additive utility, εl,w ≥ 0 implies γ ≤ 1.5 for




households, implying that the bound on γ is tighter for many households. Note that if
y =0 , γ < 1, consistent with Figure 1.
Table 2 generalizes this calibration result by showing the implied value of γ for several
other cases, including cases where εl,w < 0 and cases with complementarity. Each column
considers a diﬀerent value for the ratio of the income eﬀect of a 1 percent wage increase to the
substitution eﬀect, deﬁned as I/εc
l,w = −lw
y εl,y/εc
l,w.11 Each row represents a diﬀerent value
of the degree of complementarity. The table reports the implied γ in each cell assuming
10In a recent survey of 134 labor and public economists at 40 leading research institutions, Victor Fuchs,
Alan Krueger, and James Poterba (1998) found that the vast majority of these experts believe that the best
estimate of the uncompensated wage elasticity is weakly positive.
11The Slutsky decomposition for a wage increase is εl,w = εlc,w + lw
y εl,y,w h e r et h eﬁrst term on the right
hand side is the substitution eﬀe c ta n dt h es e c o n di st h ei n c o m ee ﬀect. Hence I = −lw
y εl,y corresponds to
t h e( a b s o l u t ev a l u eo f )t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect of a wage increase.
15y
wl = 1
2 (see Appendix B for details). For instance, the benchmark case of εl,w =0implies
I/εc
l,w =1(income and substitution eﬀects cancel exactly). With no complementarity this
yields γ =1 .5, consistent with the derivation above.
The calibrations show that γ does not rise much if the labor supply curve is downward
sloping to the extent suggested by the macroeconomic evidence in part D of Table 1. The
macro evidence, which yields the most negative estimates of εl,w o fa l lt h es t u d i e s ,i m p l i e s
I/εc
l,w less than 4
3 (see Appendix B). At this value, γ rises to 2. The calibrations also
show that γ is not very sensitive to the degree of complementarity. With I/εc
l,w =1and
the upper bound complementarity value of ∆c
c /∆l
l =0 .15, γ rises to 1.94. The bottom line
is that generating γ signiﬁcantly greater than 2 would require complementarity and labor
supply patterns that contradict evidence to date sharply.
III Discussion
A few recent papers have also conducted “internal consistency checks” of standard models of
consumption behavior. Most relevant is Susanto Basu and Miles Kimball [BK] (2002), who
build on Robert King et. al. (1988). BK show that reconciling low estimates of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) with εl,w ≥ 0 requires either strong complementarity
between consumption and labor or time non-separable utility. To see how our results are
related, consider the case where utility is additive over c and l. Here, the BK result is that
time separability is inconsistent with εl,w > 0 and low EIS. In contrast, this paper shows that
state separability (expected utility theory) is inconsistent with εl,w > 0 and high γ.T h e
two results thus address two aspects of preferences — intertemporal substitution and risk
aversion — that are empirically and intuitively distinct (Hall (1988), Philippe Weil (1990),
Larry Epstein and Stanley Zin (1991)). While the BK result leaves γ unidentiﬁed, the bound
in this paper leaves the EIS unrestricted because U(·) is permitted to be an arbitrary time
16non-separable function.12 Similarly, while habit formation (which drops time separability)
can resolve the BK bound on the EIS, it does not relax the bound on risk aversion.
Matthew Rabin (1999) and Louis Kaplow (2005) also give calibration results for risk
preferences in an expected utility model. Rabin shows that expected utility cannot generate
a reasonably high level of moderate-stakes risk aversion without creating unreasonably high
large-stakes risk aversion. Kaplow shows that estimates of the income elasticity of the
value of a statistical life bound γ because the rich would pay much more to save their lives
if the marginal utility of non-health consumption fell quickly with wealth. Each of these
calibration arguments illuminates the restrictions inherent in expected utility theory in a
diﬀerent way.
IV Conclusion
A large literature on labor supply has found that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor
supply is not very negative. This observation places a bound on the rate at which the
marginal utility of consumption diminishes, and thus bounds risk aversion in an expected
utility model. The central estimate of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion implied by
labor supply studies is 1 (log utility) and an upper bound is 2, accounting for substantial
complementarity between consumption and labor. The intuition for this tight bound is
simple: If the marginal utility of wealth diminishes rapidly, why don’t people choose to work
much less when their wages rise?
This result implies that diminishing marginal utility of wealth plays a secondary role
in generating the high levels of risk aversion estimated in many studies of choice under
uncertainty. An additional, quantitatively powerful source of risk aversion must be identiﬁed
12Another way to see this point is to consider Kreps-Porteus utility. When the only risk at issue is an
immediately resolved one, the Kreps-Porteus speciﬁcation is a special case of the general time non-separable
class of utility functions analyzed above. Consequently, the arguments above bound risk aversion over
immediately-resolved wealth gambles for a Kreps-Porteus utility, but do not pin down the EIS.
17to explain observed behavior in these cases.13 Testing alternative models of risk preferences
under the constraints on curvature imposed by labor supply behavior would be an interesting
direction for further research. More generally, examining how one domain of behavior (such
as labor supply) disciplines the conclusions drawn in another domain (such as choice under
uncertainty) could be a useful method of developing uniﬁed, internally consistent theories of
economic behavior.
13Recent examples of theories that introduce additional sources of risk aversion beyond diminishing mar-
ginal utility include Botond Koszegi and Rabin’s (2005) model of reference-dependent risk preferences and
Raj Chetty’s (2004) model of consumption commitments and local risk aversion.
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21Appendix A: Curvature of utility over wealth
Deﬁne indirect utility over wealth when l is endogenous as
v(y)=u(y + wl(y),l(y))









Recall the expression for ∂l/∂y in (4):
∂l
∂y
= K(wucc + ucl) (11)
where K = − 1
w2ucc+2wucl+ull. Equation (5) implies that ∂lc
∂y = − uc
w2ucc+2wucl+ull. Utility
maximization requires ∂lc
∂w > 0, implying that K>0.
Recognizing that ∂c/∂y =1+w∂l/∂y, it follows that






Now plug in using (11) for ∂l/∂y in the preceding expression to obtain
vyy = ucc + K[w
2u
2
cc + wuccucl + u
2
cl]
= ucc + K[wucc + ucl]
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This proves that γy < γ, i.e. that the curvature of utility over wealth is lower when l is
endogenous.
22Appendix B: Construction of Tables 1 and 2




MaCurdy (1981) does not report the mean ratio of unearned to earned income in his sample
and the Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) elasticity estimates are an average across several
diﬀerent studies, some of which do not report
y
wl. All other rows in part A use the mean
reported values of y and wl in conjunction with the elasticity estimates reported in that
study. In part B, I use the CRRA approximation used to derive equation (10) to estimate γ
with the reported extensive-margin elasticities. In part C, I use the Imbens. et. al. income




2. The compensated wage elasticity estimates in the earned income
literature are the elasticity of earned income with respect to the net of tax rate.
In part D, for the Blau and Kahn (2005) study, I take the average of the three sets
of substitution elasticities reported for three diﬀerent periods. The income elasticity is
deﬁned as the elasticity of women’s hours with respect to husband’s wages and computed in
corresponding fashion. I estimate γ using the mean value of y and wl reported by Blau and
Kahn for their sample.
For the remaining two studies in part D, I ﬁrst estimate the uncompensated wage elastic-
ity εl,w from Mulligan (2002), who reports a 25 percent drop in aggregate hours over the 20th
century while real hourly wages rose by roughly a factor of 8. This implies εl,w ≈− 0.035.
To account for the possibility that labor supply might be less arduous than it was 100 years
ago (e.g. individuals get more breaks today), I double this value to obtain εl,w = −.07.
Note that placing a lower bound on εl,w l e a d st oa nu p p e rb o u n do nγ given an estimate
of εc
l,w. Estimates of the compensated wage elasticity are obtained from other studies that
compare trends or levels across countries with varying tax and transfer regimes (Prescott
2004, Davis and Henrekson 2004). These tax responses can be interpreted as compensated
wage elasticities of aggregate labor supply since non-transfer government expenditure can be
viewed as unearned income in the aggregate. Income elasticities are then computed for each








The overall mean estimates of γ are unweighted means of the values reported in each
study. In computing the mean, the Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) values are given a weight
o f2 0s i n c et h i sl i n er e p r e s e n t sa na v e r a g eo ft w e n t yd i ﬀerent studies.
Notes on Table 2: The formula used for the calibrations reported in Table 2 is derived
as follows. Rewrite the Slutsky equation given in (5) in terms of elasticities:




Let I ≡− lw
y εl,y = −∂wl
y denote the income eﬀect of a wage increase. Then we can write γ





















To derive the bound of I
εc
l,w < 4
3 implied by the macro trend evidence described in the
text, note that εl,w = −0.07 is a lower bound on the uncompensated wage elasticity for
reasons described above. Given this parameter, it is necessary to place a lower bound on
εc
l,w to obtain an upper bound on I
εc
l,w and γ. Most studies ﬁnd εc
l,w above 0.2,w i t ht h e
macroeconomic evidence suggesting larger values. With εl,w = −0.07 and εc
l,w =0 .2,t h e




24Appendix C: Extensive Margin
Suppose that the agent makes a binary decision to work and supply 1 unit of labor or
n o tt ow o r ka ta l l . L e ty denote unearned income and w the additional income earned by
working. Returning temporarily to additive utility over consumption and leisure, redeﬁne
u(c) as the utility from consumption. Let ψ denote disutility of supplying 1 unit of labor.
The agent chooses labor supply by solving
max
l∈{0,1}
u(y + wl) − ψl
He works if his disutility of labor is less than the utility of an additional w units of consump-
tion, i.e. if
ψ < b ψ(y,w) ≡ u(y + w) − u(y)
Suppose there is heterogeneity in disutility of labor in the economy given by a smooth










uc(y) − uc(y + w)
uc(y + w)
(14)
This expression shows that the percent change in marginal utility of wealth from y to y +w
is equal to the ratio of the income and wage eﬀects on labor supply. In the intensive labor
supply model, we could compute γ(c) at any level c without making any functional form
assumptions because we could observe how marginal utility changes for small changes in
income. With extensive labor supply decisions, we observe only the change in marginal
utility between y and y + w. Consequently, we need to make a functional form assumption
for u(c) to translate the change in marginal utilities into a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.









y−γ − (y + w)−γ
(y + w)−γ
14If γ(c) actually varies with c, this method yields the best constant-γ ﬁt of the data, which can be loosely
interpreted as the average γ(c) in the region c ∈ [y,y + w].










Finally, a model of exogenous extensive-margin labor supply shocks analogous to that in the













c denotes the consumption drop associated with job loss.





This appendix establishes a connection between the consumption drop observed from a
transitory labor supply shock and the corresponding drop that would result from a permanent
labor supply shock. When the short-run drop understates the size of the long-run drop, I
show that the ratio of these two values can be bounded by a parameter that measures the
strength of cross-period complementarities in utility.
Let
∆ct/ct
∆lt/lt |LR, denote the consumption change in period t for a permanent labor supply
shock that raises labor supply proportionally in all periods by ∆lt/lt = ∆l/l.L e t
∆ct/ct
∆lt/lt |SR
denote the response of consumption in period t to a transitory labor supply ﬂuctuation that
shifts lt alone. The analysis below requires the following assumption.
Assumption A1. Within-period complementarity across consumption and labor is
stronger than cross-period complementarities: |Uctlt| > |Uctlt+1|.
T h i sc o n d i t i o ni si n t u i t i v e :i tr e q u i r e st h a tat r a n s i t o r ys h o c kt olt generates smaller ∆cs
for s 6= t than a permanent shock to l that changes lt ∀t.
I begin by considering the eﬀect of transitory variation labor supply on consumption.
Assume without loss of generality that the agent faces uncertainty in l1, while all subsequent
ln are known with certainty. Denote the two states of the world with superscripts a and b
and assume la
1 >l b
1. An agent maximizing utility over his lifecycle chooses his consumption






























Here and subsequently we drop the remainder from this expression, which is appropriate if
we ultimately take the limit as ∆l → 0 as in the text. Since ∆ln =0∀n>1,t h eo p t i m a l i t y










Let γc1 = −
Uc1c1
Uc1 c1, the curvature of utility over period 1 consumption. Algebraic rearrang-











Now consider permanent variation in in l, resulting in a constant proportional change ∆lt
lt






















































































Since we are interested in placing bounds on complementarity, I focus on the case where
ct and lt are complements, i.e.
∆c1/c1
∆l1/l1 |SR > 0. Equation (18) indicates that the short
run consumption drop understates the long-run drop if the last two terms on the right
hand side are positive. Under the assumption that cross-period complementarity is weaker




∆l/l |LR.T h e r e f o r e ,





∆l1/l1 |SR. Since this is the case of interest in deriving a bound on risk











equals a consumption-weighted average of the consumption change (across all periods) asso-





l |LR,i . e .t h e
total consumption drop is lower than the largest drop in a given period. Without loss of




































When consumption is complementarity across periods, it can be shown that
∆cn/cn
∆l1/l1 |SR > 0.
Intuitively, the agent will choose higher consumption at all times in the high transitory-
labor state to maintain similar consumption streams across periods in the two states. Since































∆lt/lt |SR] is the largest observed short-run consumption drop over the agent’s























lt is determined by µ, the degree of
cross-period complementarity in consumption. The denominator of µ represents the eﬀect of
raising period 1 consumption by a percentage ∆c/c (and leaving all other consumption and
labor levels ﬁxed) on Uc1 (the marginal utility of consumption in period 1). The numerator
of µ is the eﬀect on Uc1 of increasing c in all periods by the same ﬁxed percentage ∆c/c while
increasing labor supply in all periods n>1 by a ﬁxed percentage ∆l/l. Hence, µ represents
how much changing cn and ln in all other periods besides period 1 dampens the change in
Uc1 relative to a change in only c1. Note that if there are no cross-period complementarities
in U, µ =1 .
29TABLE 1
Labor Supply Elasticities and Implied Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion
Income Compensated γ γ
Study Sample Identification Elasticity Wage Elasticity Additive ∆c/c=0.15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Hours
MaCurdy (1981) Married Men Panel -0.020 0.130 0.46 0.60
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) Men Various -0.120 0.567 0.63 0.82
MaCurdy, Green, Paarsch (1990) Married Men Cross Section -0.010 0.035 1.47 1.81
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) Married Men, Inc < 30K EITC Expansions -0.030 0.192 0.88 1.08
Married Women, Inc < 30K EITC Expansions -0.040 0.088 0.64 1.34
Friedberg (2000) Older Men (63-71) Soc. Sec. Earnings Test -0.297 0.545 0.93 1.46
Blundell, Duncan, Meghir (1998) Women, UK Tax Reforms -0.185 0.301 0.93 1.66
Average 0.69 0.94
B. Participation
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) Married Men, Inc < 30K EITC Expansions -0.008 0.033 0.44 0.48
Married Women, Inc < 30K EITC Expansions -0.038 0.288 0.15 0.30
Average 0.29 0.39
C. Earned Income
Imbens, Rubin, Sacerdote (2001) Lottery Players in MA Lottery Winnings -0.110
Feldstein (1995) Married, Inc > 30K TRA 1986 1.040 0.32 0.41
Auten and Carroll (1997) Single and Married, Inc>15K TRA 1986 0.660 0.50 0.65
Average 0.41 0.53
D. Macroeconomic/Trend Evidence
Blau and Kahn (2005) Women Cohort Trends -0.278 0.646 0.60 1.29
Davis and Henrekson (2004) Europe/US aggregate stats Cross-Section of countries -0.251 0.432 1.74 2.25
Prescott (2004) Europe/US aggregate stats Cross-Country time series -0.222 0.375 1.78 2.30
Average 1.37 1.95
Overall Average 0.71 0.97
NOTES -- All risk aversion estimates are computed at sample means of y and wl unless noted otherwise.  In Part A, the Blundell and MaCurdy
estimates are an unweighted average of the 20 elasticities reported in that study and assumes y/wl=1/2.  In Part B, calculations of γ assume 
CRRA utility.  In Part C, compensated wage elasticity column reports the elasticity of earned income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.  
For these studies, the Imbens et. al. estimate of the income elasticity is used to compute g.  In Part D, income elasticities for the Davis and
Henrekson and Prescott studies are computed from estimates in Mulligan (2002).  See Appendix B for further details on the construction of this table.TABLE 2
Labor Supply, Complementarity, and Risk Aversion: Calibration Results
Labor Supply Elasticity Ratio: Ι/ε
c
l,w
0.33 0.66 1.00 1.33 1.66
0.00 0.50 0.99 1.50 2.00 2.49
Complementarity 0.05 0.54 1.07 1.62 2.16 2.69
(∆c/c)/(∆l/l) 0.10 0.58 1.16 1.76 2.35 2.93
0.15 0.64 1.28 1.94 2.57 3.21
0.20 0.71 1.41 2.14 2.85 3.56
NOTES -- This table shows the implied value of γ for various income/substitution elasticity
ratios and consumption-labor complementarity levels.  Values of γ are computed using
equation (12) with y/wl=1/2.  See Appendix B for additional details.l lB l0          lA
w0uc(w0l,l) -ul(w0l,l)
uc,ul
Case A: γ < 1
w1uc(w1l,l)
w1uc(w1l,l)




Risk Aversion and the Uncompensated Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply
NOTE—This ﬁgure illustrates the labor supply decision of an agent who has no unearned
income (y =0 )a tt w ow a g el e v e l s( i n i t i a lw a g ew0 and new wage w1 >w 0). The downward-
sloping lines show the marginal consumption utility of working for an extra hour and the
upward sloping lines show the marginal disutility of working that hour. The optimal level
of labor supply is determined by the intersection of these curves. The eﬀect of the wage
increase on labor supply is shown for two cases under the assumption that ucl =0 :( A )
γ < 1, where the increase in w raises labor supply from l0 to lA;a n d( B )γ > 1,w h e r et h e
same increase in w reduces labor supply from l0 to lB.I f ucl 6=0 ,c h a n g e si nw shift the
marginal disutility of labor curve as shown in the shaded region, loosening the bound on γ.